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Abstract
One of the central logical ideas in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-
philosophicus is the elimination of the identity sign in favor of the so-
called “exclusive interpretation” of names and quantifiers requiring dif-
ferent names to refer to different objects and (roughly) different variables
to take different values. In this paper, we examine a recent develop-
ment of these ideas in papers by Kai Wehmeier. We diagnose two main
problems of Wehmeier’s account, the first concerning the treatment of in-
dividual constants, the second concerning so-called “pseudo-propositions”
(Scheinsa¨tze) of classical logic such as a = a or a = b∧b = c→ a = c. We
argue that overcoming these problems requires two fairly drastic depar-
tures from Wehmeier’s account: (1) Not every formula of classical first-
order logic will be translatable into a single formula of Wittgenstein’s
exclusive notation. Instead, there will often be a multiplicity of possible
translations, revealing the original “inclusive” formulas to be ambiguous.
(2) Certain formulas of first-order logic such as a = a will not be trans-
latable into Wittgenstein’s notation at all, being thereby revealed as non-
sensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from a “correct”
conceptual notation. We provide translation procedures from inclusive
quantifier-free logic into the exclusive notation that take these modifica-
tions into account and define a notion of logical equivalence suitable for
assessing these translations.
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§1 Introduction
One of the central logical ideas in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus
is the elimination of the identity sign from logical notation. At the time, this idea
was taken very seriously, for example by Bertrand Russell and Frank Ramsey.
Russell considered Wittgenstein’s criticism of Principia’s definition of identity
“a destructive criticism from which there seems no escape” (Wittgenstein 1998,
p. 274) and tried to make amends in Principia’s second edition. Frank Ramsey
tried to incorporate “Wittgenstein’s discovery that the sign of identity is not
a necessary constituent of logical notation” (Ramsey 1990, p. 194) into his
own revision of Principia’s version of the foundations of mathematics. Two
other notable commentators were Kurt Grelling and Friedrich Waismann.1 But
since then, interest has largely faded2 and first-order logic with identity has
become standard. In recent years, however, discussion has picked up again and
it could be argued that only with the work of authors like Juliet Floyd, Kai
Wehmeier and Gregory Landini have we moved close to a full understanding of
Wittgenstein’s proposal. In part, this delay seems due to a reluctance to engage
not only with the philosophical aspects of the proposal but also with the details
of its technical execution.
In this paper we examine what seems to us the most advanced recent devel-
opment of Wittgenstein’s identity-free logic, which is given in a series of papers
by Kai Wehmeier. We diagnose two main problems of Wehmeier’s account, the
first concerning the treatment of individual constants (or names), the second
concerning so-called “pseudo-propositions” (Scheinsa¨tze) of classical logic3 such
as a = a or a = b ∧ b = c → a = c. We argue that overcoming these problems
requires two fairly drastic departures from Wehmeier’s account: (1) Not every
formula of classical first-order logic will be translatable into a single formula
of Wittgenstein’s “exclusive” notation. In many cases there will instead be a
set of possible translations, revealing the original formulas to be ambiguous in
a certain way. (2) Certain formulas of first-order logic such as a = a will not
be translatable into Wittgenstein’s notation at all. These formulas are thereby
revealed as nonsensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from a
“correct” conceptual notation. In order to keep the discussion focussed on these
two points, our alternative account of Wittgenstein’s exclusive notation in this
paper will be restricted to the fragment of quantifier-free logic (i.e., first-order
logic with names and identity, but without quantifiers).
1Cf. Grelling (1936) and Waismann (1936).
2One important exception being Hintikka (1956).
3By “classical logic” we mean first-order predicate logic with identity and the usual “inclu-
sive” interpretation of quantifiers and constants (see sections §2 and §3 for the contrast with
Wittgenstein’s “exclusive” notation).
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§2 Wittgenstein’s Proposal for the Elimination
of Identity
Wittgenstein’s main proposal concerning identity in the Tractatus is outlined in
remarks 5.53 to 5.5352. The core of his proposal is stated right at the beginning:4
5.53 Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by
using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference
of signs.
He illustrates this proposal with a couple of examples both for individual
constants and quantifiers.
5.531 Thus I do not write ‘f(a, b).a = b’, but ‘f(a, a)’ (or ‘f(b, b)’);
and not ‘f(a, b). ∼ a = b’, but ‘f(a, b)’.
5.532 And analogously I do not write ‘(∃x, y).f(x, y).x = y’, but
‘(∃x).f(x, x)’; and not ‘(∃x, y).f(x, y). ∼ x = y’, but ‘(∃x, y).f(x, y)’.
(So Russell’s ‘(∃x, y).f(x, y)’ becomes ‘(∃x, y).f(x, y).∨.(∃x).f(x, x)’.)
Wittgenstein’s convention for individual constants (names) therefore requires
a one-to-one correspondence between individual constants and objects. The
convention for quantifiers requires that under certain circumstances quantifiers
are to be interpreted “exclusively”, i.e. different variables will take different
objects as values.5 If carried out, Wittgenstein’s twin conventions are intended
to obviate the need for a sign for identity.
It may seem puzzling at first that in another cluster of remarks subordinate
to 4.42 which deal with names as “simple symbols”, Wittgenstein seems to give
the identity sign a role in logical notation:
4.241 When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, I
express this by putting the sign ‘=’ between them. So ‘a = b’ means
that the sign ‘b’ can be substituted for the sign ‘a’.
However, it is important to distinguish between identity as a relation between
objects and identity of meaning as a relation between signs. Concerning the first,
Wittgenstein clearly states that “identity is not a relation between objects”
(5.5301) because “to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and
to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing” (5.5303).
Statements expressing sameness of meaning, on the other hand, are merely
“rules dealing with signs” (4.241) or “representational devices” (4.242). One
crucial question for any account of Wittgenstein’s exclusive notation concerns
the interpretation of the identity signs occuring in 5.531 and following. On our
view, these remarks show how identity statements understood as rules governing
the use of signs can be used for eliminating the identity sign from Russellian
4All English quotes are from the Pears / McGuiness translation.
5The terminology of “exclusive” vs. “inclusive” interpretations is due to Hintikka (1956, p.
226). As we will see, the second convention is ambiguous and has to be defined more precisely.
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notation and it therefore remains true that “the identity sign is not an essential
constituent of conceptual notation” (5.533).
As with many of Wittgenstein’s doctrines, he apparently wasn’t interested
in working out his proposal for eliminating identity systematically. But there is
a very early attempt to work it out by Frank Ramsey, who reported in his clas-
sical paper on the foundations of mathematics that “the convention is slightly
ambiguous, but can be made definite, and is then workable, although gener-
ally inconvenient” (Ramsey 1990, pp. 194-195). The details of his account
were published in manuscripts edited from his Nachlass (Ramsey 1991). In the
meantime, Hintikka (1956) seems to have been the only serious attempt to spell
out the proposal. After Hintikka’s canonical paper there has been little serious
discussion of the exclusive interpretation of quantifiers until the issue was taken
up in Floyd (2001), Wehmeier (2004) and Landini (2007).
§3 Wehmeier’s Account of the Elimination of
Identity
Since Wittgenstein gives no explicit set of rules for handling his exclusive quan-
tifiers and names, there is some leeway in interpreting the intended convention.
As Wehmeier convincingly argues, the so-called “weakly exclusive” interpreta-
tion is best positioned both exegetically and systematically. For the weakly
exclusive interpretation Ramsey set down the following two semantic rules:
Two different constants must not have the same meaning. An ap-
parent variable cannot [have] the value of any letter occurring in its
scope, unless the letter is a variable apparent in that scope. (Ramsey
1991, p. 159)
The term “letter” here covers both constants (names) and variables. A
variable “apparent in the scope” of a quantifier is a variable bound by that
quantifier. So, in effect, the convention tells us that two different names cannot
have the same referent and that the range of a bound variable excludes the
values (or referents) of any free variable or name occurring in the scope of the
binding quantifier. If we take the exclusive formula ∃x∃yFxy from remark 5.532
as an example, the variables x and y cannot take the same value because in the
subformula ∃yFxy, the variable x occurs freely within the scope of the quantifier
binding the variable y. If names are present, their values are also excluded from
the range of any bound variable in the scope of whose quantifier they occur.6
Wehmeier’s procedure for translating classical inclusive formulas into the
exclusive notation7 has remained almost invariant throughout his papers and is
given here in its latest version. Atomic formulas can be left unchanged. The
translation of a conjunction is the conjunction of the translations of the con-
juncts. The translation of a negated formula is the negation of the translation
6A precise semantic definition will be given in section 4.7.
7We henceforth drop the qualifier “weakly”.
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Table 1: Comparison of Wittgenstein’s and Wehmeier’s translations
Russellian Wittgenstein Wehmeier
#1 Fab ∧ a = b Faa (or Fbb) Fab ∧ (Rab ∧ ¬Rab)
#2 Fab ∧ ¬a = b Fab Fab ∧ ¬(Rab ∧ ¬Rab)
#3 ∃x∃y(Fxy ∧ x = y) ∃xFxx ∃x(∃y(Fxy∧(Rxy∧¬Rxy))∨
(Fxx ∧ (Px ∨ ¬Px)))
#4 ∃x∃y(Fxy ∧ ¬x = y) ∃x∃yFxy ∃x(∃y(Fxy ∧ ¬(Rxy ∧
¬Rxy)) ∨ (Fxx ∧ ¬(Px ∨
¬Px)))
#5 ∃x∃yFxy ∃x∃yFxy ∨ ∃xFxx ∃x(∃yFxy ∨ Fxx)
of the formula and so on for all other sentence connectives. So the issue boils
down to (1) quantifier rules and (2) rules for identity. Statements of the form
∀xφ are translated by ∀xψ ∧ ψ(y1/x) ∧ ψ(y2/x) . . . where y1, y2, . . . are the free
variables (or names) in φ other than x, ψ is the translation of φ into exclusive
notation and ψ(y1/x) is the translation of φ into exclusive notation after re-
placing all free occurrences of x in φ by y1. Analogously, ∃xφx is translated by
∃xψ∨ψ(y1/x)∨ψ(y2/x)∨ . . .. Identity statements of form x = y are translated
by any contradiction in x and y (for example, Rxy ∧ ¬Rxy) while identities of
form x = x are translated by any tautology in x (for example Px ∨ ¬Px). For
the purpose of translation, names can be treated as free variables, so x = y and
x = x here cover both variables and names. Translating back from Wittgen-
stein’s system to classical logic can be achieved by similar rules.
Prima facie, it would seem to be a minimal requirement for any attempted
reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s account to handle the cases that are explic-
itly provided in the Tractatus. So it may come as a surprise that Wehmeier’s
translation procedure fails this test. Table 1 contains the Russellian formulas
of remarks 5.531 and 5.532 along with their translations according to Wittgen-
stein and Wehmeier.8 We are not going to discuss the quantified cases in de-
tail here. Concerning the quantifier-free cases, something is clearly wrong with
case #1. Wittgenstein’s translation of the non-contradictory Russellian formula
Fab∧a = b is the equally non-contradictoy formula Faa while Wehmeier’s trans-
lation Fab∧(Rab∧¬Rab) is contradictory, given one-to-one correlations between
names and objects (cf. Rogers & Wehmeier 2012, p.12). In the next section we
examine this and related cases involving individual constants more closely.
8To make the comparison more transparent, we have slightly simplified the raw output of
Wehmeier’s algorithm.
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§4 The Problem of Individual Constants
4.1 Wehmeier’s Treatment of Individual Constants
The failure in case Fab∧a = b is explicitly acknowledged in Rogers & Wehmeier
(2012, pp. 11-12). Rogers and Wehmeier argue that no adequate translation
is possible because exclusive logic cannot express what is classically expressed
by a = b.9 On their view, Wittgenstein’s own translation Faa (or Fbb) is
inadequate, because it fails to have the same truth conditions as the original
inclusive formula. However, both Faa and Fbb are implied by Fab∧a = b, and so
Rogers and Wehmeier speculate that Wittgenstein, faced with the impossibility
of adequately translating the case, may have substituted an implication of the
original formula for translation. On our view, this dismissal of Wittgenstein’s
translation of case #1 reveals a crucial misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s view
of identity statements. Our intention in this paper is to develop an alternative
account preserving Wittgenstein’s translation.
As a consequence of excluding case #1, Rogers and Wehmeier have restricted
their translatability results in certain ways and argued for the exegetic or sys-
tematic adequacy of these restrictions. One remedy considered by them is to
impose the so-called “satisfaction principle” on classical logic, i.e. to demand
that there be a one-to-one correlation between names and objects. This move
would certainly give Rogers’ and Wehmeier’s own translation Fab∧(Rab∧¬Rab)
the right truth conditions. But while it is clear that Wittgenstein intends the
satisfaction principle to obtain for Tractarian logic, he nowhere suggests that it
should be imposed as a prerequisite on classical logic. In fact, it would hardly
make sense for him to offer Faa or Fbb as translations of Fab ∧ a = b if a and
b couldn’t co-refer in the classical statement. Therefore, it is a little misleading
for Wehmeier to suggest that in imposing the satisfaction principle on classi-
cal logic we would somehow be “[following] Wittgenstein”(Rogers & Wehmeier
2012, p. 11).
Wehmeier states that, with respect to languages without any individual con-
stants, “W-logic and FOL= are fully equivalent” (Wehmeier 2008, p. 10). Con-
sequently, another argument given by Rogers and Wehmeier for the adequacy
of their presentation of “W-logic” is that, according to Wittgenstein, “names
are not essential for a description of the world” (Rogers & Wehmeier 2012, p.
10). Indeed, the following remark of the Tractatus can be quoted in support of
this argument:
5.526 We can describe the world completely by means of fully
generalized propositions, i.e. without first correlating any name with
a particular object.
In a footnote, Rogers and Wehmeier equate this idea with the eliminability
of names from first-order logic and point to a technical proof of this in Boolos
9See Wehmeier (2008, pp.11-12) for a proof to this effect. This proof will be examined in
section 4.3.
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et al. (2007, pp. 255-257). So, in effect, the problem of accounting for Wittgen-
stein’s translation of case #1 is simply rejected as irrelevant because names
can be eliminated from first-order logic without loss of expressive power. One
thing to note concerning this argument is that Wittgenstein is very explicit in
his examples that individual constants are part of the language of Tractarian
logic. So it seems strange to base an argument for the acceptability of a trans-
lation procedure on the eliminability of these names. Furthermore, the proof
in Boolos merely shows that for each formula φ containing names there is a
formula ψ without names which is satisfiable iff φ is satisfiable. In our context,
this standard of equisatisfiability seems too low to guarantee the expressive ad-
equacy of exclusive translations. In fact, Wehmeier himself defines a stricter
notion of logical equivalence between inclusive and exclusive notation. His defi-
nition is essentially a restriction of the classical definition of logical equivalence
to structures and assignments that are “one-on-one” (cf. Wehmeier 2004, p. 3).
Finally, Wehmeier suggests that the problem could be solved by adding a
“co-denotation predicate” to the language of Tractarian logic (Wehmeier 2008,
pp. 12-14), which expresses not identity of object but identity of meaning as
a relation between signs. This approach is based on remark 4.241ff (see above,
section §2). The fact that this is possible and renders Tractarian logic equivalent
to classical logic is a significant result. Still, the question remains how this
proposal relates to Wittgenstein’s main idea of eliminating the identity sign.
Clearly, this idea is not restricted to a sign for “objectual identity”; his claim is
straight and simple: there is no need for any kind of identity sign in logic. This
point is made clearly in 5.533 and also, for example in Waismann’s “Thesen”(cf.
Waismann 1984, pp. 242-243). Another reason why this isn’t convincing is that
it makes little sense as an account of the translations in 5.531. According to
metalinguistic identity, the translation of Fab ∧ a = b would not be Faa (or
Fbb) but Fab ∧ a ≡ b with the triple bar representing metalinguistic identity.
So it seems that after considering Wehmeier’s arguments, the fact remains
that his translation procedure cannot account for case #1. The arguments for
why this isn’t a serious problem are unconvincing and so in the absence of
further arguments we have to conclude that either Wittgenstein’s proposal is
a failure unless first-order logic is restricted in artificial ways or there must be
some other way of accounting for Wittgenstein’s case #1.
4.2 The Missing Case
Before we go on to discuss case #1 and its possible accommodation in a sys-
tematic account of Tractarian logic, we should point out a peculiar gap in
Wittgenstein’s presentation of cases. The basic cases concerning names and
quantifiers are presented in 5.531 and 5.532. Comparing these two remarks and
the five cases presented there, reveals a certain symmetry which is broken at
one point. In 5.532, Wittgenstein first presents the cases ∃x∃y(Fxy ∧ x = y)
and ∃x∃y(Fxy∧¬x = y), which translate to ∃xFxx and ∃x∃yFxy, respectively.
In these two cases, the statement in exclusive notation (which is usually more
cumbersome) is actually shorter than the inclusive statement, so let us call these
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two cases “contracting cases”. These two are followed by a parenthetical remark
giving a case which we will (in analogy) call the “expanding case”: ∃x∃yFxy,
translated as ∃x∃yFxy ∨ ∃xFxx. In 5.531, we see that Wittgenstein also first
presents the two contracting cases: Fab ∧ a = b, translated either as Faa or
Fbb, and Fab∧¬a = b, translated as Fab. What is missing in 5.531, however, is
the parenthetical statement of the expanding case. This omission seems all the
more striking because it is obvious that the inclusive statement using names,
which would correspond to the inclusive ∃x∃yFxy, is readily available: it is
simply the statement Fab. The symmetry between 5.531 and 5.532 is clearly
intentional, so it couldn’t be lost on Wittgenstein that there was a missing case
in 5.532. Why didn’t Wittgenstein provide a translation for this case?
The answer seems to be that the translation of the inclusive Fab is even
more problematic than the translation of Fab ∧ a = b which has haunted Weh-
meier’s account. What seems clear is that the translation of Fab has to contain
a disjunction of cases, Fab being equivalent to Fab ∧ a = b ∨ Fab ∧ ¬a = b.
This would also be in line with the translation of the expanding case ∃x∃yFxy.
Going on Wehmeier’s sensible rule of translating a disjunction by the disjunc-
tion of the translations of the disjuncts, this would seem to yield a disjunction
with either Faa or Fbb as first disjunct and Fab (exclusive) as second disjunct.
Putting these together would yield either Faa ∨ Fab or Fbb ∨ Fab (exclusive)
as translations of Fab (inclusive). But this is intolerable, because Faa ∨ Fab
and Fbb ∨ Fab are clearly not equivalent. This peculiarity reflects back on
Wittgenstein’s translation of case #1 because it makes us wonder what exactly
Wittgenstein meant by translating Fab∧ a = b as “Faa or Fbb”. It seems clear
that this “or” cannot be a disjunction in the object language, but taking it as
the license to translate either way (which seems the most natural reading) is
also problematic once we go beyond the simplest case. Certainly, the exclu-
sive translations Faa and Fbb are, in a sense, equivalent. This is not logical
equivalence in the ordinary sense, but given the co-reference expressed by the
identity statement a = b, there should be nothing to distinguish between Faa
and Fbb because the names a and b are intersubstitutable throughout the for-
mula. How to incorporate this view into a coherent translation of the “missing
case”, however,will be one of the main challenges in this paper.
4.3 Criteria of Success
As pointed out in 4.1, Wehmeier (2008, pp.11-12) contains a proof that Wittgen-
steinian logic cannot express what is expressed by a = b in classical first-order
logic. What this proof boils down to is that there are certain first-order models
which can be distinguished by the formula a = b but cannot be distinguished by
any formula of Wittgensteinian logic. Given two models M1 and M2 in which
(1) all predicates apply universally and (2) the only difference between the mod-
els is that in M1 the constants a and b have the same interpretation, whereas in
M2 the interpretation =(a) differs from =(b), the classical formula a = b will be
true in M1 and false in M2. But there is no formula of exclusive logic for which
this holds; all exclusive formulas will be either true in both models or false in
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both models. From the point of present-day model theory, the proof is impec-
cable. But one could argue that from Wittgenstein’s perspective the concept of
“truth condition” used to state the result of the proof begs the question against
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s point may be that in the crucial case at the center
of the proof there is nothing to distinguish. Adapting some of Wittgenstein’s
terminology, the difference between these models is a mere pseudo-difference.
Still, what the proof shows is that if one is serious about accommodating
all of Wittgenstein’s cases, there is no way around facing the possibility that
classical and Tractarian logic are not equivalent in the sense that certain things
expressible in classical logic may be inexpressible in exclusive notation. Rogers
and Wehmeier note that case #1 reveals an “incommensurability” of the two
logics under investigation, but lay the blame on Wittgenstein for failing to
provide an “adequate translation” (Rogers & Wehmeier 2012, 12). It is clear
that there is a strong desire on Wehmeier’s part to show the equivalence between
classical and Tractarian logic. Motivating this desire is the idea that only by
showing the equivalence between classical and Tractarian logic can we counter
indispensability arguments for the identity relation (Wehmeier 2012, cf.). On
our view, we shouldn’t presuppose that strict equivalence to classical logic is
necessary to prove the adequacy of the exclusive notation. It may well be that,
according to Wittgenstein, certain things expressible only by means of identity
are better left unexpressed.
This complicates the search for criteria for assessing the success of any so-
lution. Obviously, the aim would still be to achieve some kind of equivalence
between inclusive and exclusive notation, even though the scope of this equiv-
alence will be limited by Wittgenstein’s philosophical arguments concerning
identity. In contemporary logic, logical equivalence is usually spelled out by ref-
erence to a semantics of the language. Even apart from specific worries about
identity, this is somewhat problematic in the context of Tractarian logic, because
Wittgenstein was strongly critical of set theory as a tool in the foundations of
mathematics and favored a purely syntactical approach to logic.10 But we don’t
want to restrict ourselves prematurely to this kind of approach. If there is any-
thing wrong in using model theory in our context, this should emerge from our
investigations and not be presupposed by fiat.
Because a semantics for the exclusive notation needs to be sensitive to our
account of the identity sign, we won’t start until section 4.7 to define a suitable
concept of logical equivalence. In the meantime we will sometimes use simple
classical models to point out certain problems. We might thus illustrate the
problem of translating the “missing case” in the following way: If we assign
different objects o1 and o2 to a and b respectively and the set containing only
the pair (o1, o1) to the predicate F , the missing case Fab (inclusive) will turn
out false but the hypothetical exclusive translation Faa ∨ Fab will turn out
true. On the other hand, Fbb ∨ Fab (exclusive), which is supposed to be an
alternative (and therefore equivalent) translation of Fab (inclusive) turns out
false.
10Compare, for example, remark 6.031 about the “superfluity” of set theory in mathematics
and the irrelevance of “accidental generality” for mathematics.
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4.4 The Scope of Names
Concerning the failure of equivalence between Fab (inclusive) and Faa ∨ Fab
(or Fbb ∨ Fab) (exclusive), it is not too difficult to see what’s going wrong. As
an intermediate step we have proposed to treat Fab as equivalent to Fab∧ a =
b∨Fab∧¬a = b. In translating the subformula Fab∧a = b (inclusive) into Faa
(or Fbb) (exclusive) we have in effect assumed a and b to refer to the same object.
In translating the subformula Fab ∧ ¬a = b (inclusive) into Fab (exclusive) we
have in effect assumed a and b to refer to different objects. Therefore it may seem
illegitimate to apply the model =(a) = o1, =(b) = o2, =(F ) = {(o1, o1)} to the
whole formula Faa∨Fab (exclusive) because the model violates the assumption
used for generating the exclusive subformula Faa (or Fbb). Similarly, any model
with =(a) = =(b) would seem inapplicable to the exclusive subformula Fab.
These observations reveal a certain predicament which may have lead Weh-
meier to his treatment of names. If we really want to represent the content of
the inclusive formula Fab in one single formula of exclusive notation, we have
to ensure that the models we use to evaluate our translations are in line with
the identity statements that we used to manufacture the exclusive statements.
This would require only models with =(a) = =(b) to be applied to the first
disjunct of Faa ∨ Fab and only models with =(a) 6= =(b) to be applied to the
second disjunct. Under such a modified semantics, we get exactly the right
truth conditions for our exclusive test statements.
Approaching this as a technical problem, the main challenge then would be
how to “remember” which identity statements were used to generate which part
of the exclusive formula without making the account circular. As an example of
an obviously circular “solution”, we could simply index every subformula in the
exclusive statement with the identity statements that went into the translation.
Such an account, however, would hardly prove identity to be an expendable part
of logical notation. On the other hand, it seems clear that some kind of extra
notation is needed to fix the class of applicable models for each subformula.
It is not enough, for example, as a general rule, to restrict interpretation to
single disjuncts. Just by looking at the exclusive formula, we cannot tell which
models we should use to interpret the disjunct Faa in Faa ∨ Fab (exclusive).
Faa∨Fab could be the result of translating Fab, but it could also be the result
of translating (Faa ∨ Fab) ∧ ¬a = b. Only in the first, but not in the second
case, would it be appropriate to use models with =(a) = =(b) for interpreting
the disjunct Faa.
Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein himself seems to provide a blueprint for
an appropriate notational device in the Notebooks. In the entry for December
2nd, 1916 he writes:
The similarity of the generality notation and the argument appears
if we write (ax)φx instead of φa. (Wittgenstein 1998, p. 90)
What Wittgenstein seems to mean is: Instead of using a name to fill the
argument position of a predicate, we could leave the open sentence φx and use
(ax) to indicate that the variable position x is “bound” by the name a. Let
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us term this device the “denotifier”. There is no indication that Wittgenstein
intended to use it for any technical purpose. Nevertheless, we could recruit it
for our purposes because the similarity to quantifiers makes it possible to draw
a crucial distinction. For the translation of the “missing case”, we could now
– quite similar to Wittgenstein’s translation of the expanding case ∃x∃yFxy
– write (ax)(by)Fxy ∨ (ax)Fxx while the translation of (Fab ∨ Faa) ∧ ¬a = b
would become (ax)(by)(Fxy∨Fxx). Similar to quantifiers, each name is thereby
assigned a certain scope.
There would still remain the problem of how exactly to fix the class of
applicable models. But even assuming any device such as the denotifier could
be made to work, we think that there is an overwhelming reason not to pursue
this approach, quite apart from the obvious fact that there is no indication
whatsoever that Wittgenstein ever intended to introduce this kind of apparatus
in order to deal with names in exclusive notation. The main problem is that
Wittgenstein’s injunction to “express identity of object by identity of sign” is
clearly violated if we use models assigning different referents to a certain name
in different parts of the formula. According to Wittgenstein, one name should
have the same meaning throughout a formula and different names should have
different meanings throughout the formula. There is simply no way to do justice
to this requirement while segmenting a formula into different scopes in which
the same name may have different meanings or different names may have the
same meaning. The “missing case” therefore faces us with a stark choice: Either
we must give up Wittgenstein’s main principle concerning identity and invent
a device such as the denotifier or we must give up the representability of the
missing case (and similar cases) in a single exclusive formula. In the next section,
we want to explore this second option.
4.5 Translation as Disambiguation
So far, we have concluded that the inclusive formula Fab seems to contain two
possibilities of translation into exclusive notation: Faa (or, equivalently, Fbb)
and Fab. The inclusive notation leaves these two possibilities open and it is this
feature that cannot be represented in a single formula in the exclusive notation.
The question may then be: Should it be possible to represent these possibilities
or is there some way to show that, from Wittgenstein’s standpoint, all is well if
we reject the representability of this feature in a single formula?
As an alternative approach, we could argue that the inclusive statement Fab
is ambiguous between the case a = b, which can be expressed as Faa or Fbb
and the case ¬a = b, which can be expressed as Fab. Because in the exclusive
notation, the correlation between names and objects has to be one-to-one, the
only way to represent this ambiguity is to say that Fab (inclusive) becomes
either Faa/Fbb (exclusive) or Fab (exclusive). A similar use of “metalinguistic
disjunction” can be found explicitly in remark 5.531. The inclusive Fab∧a = b,
Wittgenstein proposes to translate by Faa “or” Fbb. It’s obvious that this is
not a disjunction in the object language. It is a license to write either Faa or
Fbb, not a license to write Faa ∨ Fbb.
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We propose that a similar reading could be applied to the translation of the
“missing case”. The analogy is this: In both cases there is a multiplicity of
possible translations which cannot be expressed by a disjunction of cases in the
object language. In translating Fab (inclusive), we have to make up our minds
whether to write Faa or Fab (both exclusive). From this viewpoint, translation
becomes a form of disambiguation. Of course, there is also a disanalogy between
the two cases. In the case of translating Fab ∧ a = b (inclusive), the exclusive
translations Faa and Fbb are, in a sense, equivalent. By this, we don’t mean
that they are logically equivalent in the ordinary sense (they aren’t). But given
the co-reference expressed by the identity statement a = b, there is nothing
to distinguish between Faa and Fbb because the names a and b are intersub-
stitutable throughout the formula. In the case of translating the missing case
Fab, the two possible translations are non-equivalent in that sense; they are
different possibilities of diambiguation. So there are two distinct metalinguistic
uses of “or” that cannot be translated by a disjunction in the object language.
Fab ∧ a = b (inclusive) can equivalently be translated as Faa “or” Fbb (both
exclusive). Fab (inclusive) can non-equivalently be disambiguated as Faa “or”
Fab (both exclusive).11
There is some evidence in the text of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein may
have thought that anyone who understands a certain sentence must already
know whether the names occurring in that sentence have the same meaning or
different meanings (see, for example, remarks 4.243 and 6.2322), so that all we
have to do for translating a sentence like Fab (inclusive) is to decide whether
what we mean is Faa (exclusive) or Fab (exclusive). A good way to moti-
vate this approach independently of a Tractarian perspective is by appeal to
Etchemendy’s distinction between interpretational and representational seman-
tics (cf. Etchemendy 1999). According to Etchemendy, there are two ways to
understand the models of a formal language. On the representational view,
different models represent different possible configurations of the world. For
example, a truth table may tell us, that the sentence “Snow is white and roses
are red” would be false if snow was not white. On the interpretational view, the
truth table would support a much different counterfactual, not about the world,
but about language. For example, the sentence “Snow is white and roses are
red” would have been false had “Snow is white” meant what “George Washing-
ton had a beard” means now. (This may sound implausible for propositional
logic, but for the interpretation of names, the analogy should be clear.)
When we look at the models of first-order logic through this lens, it seems ob-
vious that the interpretation of names belongs to the interpretational paradigm,
while the interpretation of predicates is much more naturally understood as rep-
resentational. According to Etchemendy, a standard representational semantics
for a language needs two things: “First we define a class of models that will rep-
resent all possible configurations of the world relevant to the truth values of our
11Henceforth, we will omit Wittgenstein’s parenthetical translation Fbb of Fab ∧ a = b
because it is just another way of writing Faa. Instead of giving all possible ways a formula
could be written exclusively, we therefore propose to only give all possible translations that
are distinct in meaning.
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sentences”(Etchemendy 1999, 21). The second is a recursive definition of truth,
but let’s focus on the first step. What aspects of classical models can reasonably
be understood as “representing possible configurations of the world”?
It seems clear that the representational reading is much more natural for the
interpretation of predicates than for the interpretation of names. What really
changes between =(a) = =(b) and =(a) 6= =(b)? Only what the names a and b
mean in the model. The change affects only the “Bezeichnungsweise” (“mode
of signifying”, cf. 3.3421). On the other hand, the change from =(F ) = {}
to =(F ) = {(o1, o1)} can readily be understood as the change from a world in
which no objects stand in the relation F vs. a world in which at least one object
o1 has F to itself.
From Wittgenstein’s standpoint, logic should only represent facts, which are
“the existence of states of affairs” (2), which are formed by “configurations of
objects” (2.0272). Anything belonging only to the mode of signifying may be
shown, but cannot be said. From this standpoint, it seems natural to insist
that the interpretation of names in classical model theory doesn’t really belong
there. Interpreting a name is just a way of fixing its meaning and finding
out what a sentence means is a prerequisite for translating it. So as long as
we don’t even know whether a and b refer to the same object or to different
objects, there is no way to unambiguously represent Fab (inclusive) as a single
formula in the exclusive notation. If we insist on formulating an algorithm for
providing exclusive translations of inclusive formulas including names, all we
can do is offer possible translations. To repeat: Fab (inclusive) considered by
itself is ambiguous because it is unclear whether a and b refer to the same or
to different objects. In exclusive notation, we can express this ambiguity by
offering the set of two possible translations: {Faa, Fab}.
This account of translating from inclusive to exclusive statements puts into
effect the understanding of identity Wittgenstein expresses in remarks 4.241 and
following (cf. section §2). The statement a = b is not an assertion that can
be true or false, it is a rule for the use of the signs a and b, allowing a to be
substituted for b and vice versa. Putting this understanding into effect dispels
the problems concerning constants that have plagued Wehmeier’s account and
preserves Wittgenstein’s translations offered in 5.531.
4.6 Translating Prefix-Matrix Forms
Can we generalize the paradigm cases we have examined so far into a procedure
for translating at least a fragment of quantifier-free classical logic into the ex-
clusive dialect? The formulas Fab ∧ a = b and Fab ∧ ¬a = b exemplify a way
of thinking about identity statements that has emerged in the context of the
“denotifier”: There is a certain analogy between identity statements and quan-
tifiers. Similar to the way a “prefix” of quantifiers governs the use of variables in
a “matrix”, the statements a = b and ¬a = b can be seen as rules governing the
use of names in the statement Fab. To keep the analogy tight, we will at first
extend this approach to formulas in “prefix-matrix form” (PMF), i.e. formulas
consisting of an identity-free part (the “matrix”) connected by conjunction to
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a conjunction of identity statements (the “prefix”). We stipulate that (1) the
prefix may be empty, but not the matrix, (2) prefixes should be consistent and
non-redundant and (3) all names occurring in the prefix must occur in the ma-
trix.12 The reasoning behind these stipulations will emerge more clearly in the
next two sections; but for the moment we simply want to restrict ourselves to
cases in which the prefix can clearly be interpreted as a set of rules governing
the use of names occurring in the matrix.
The first challenge will be to define the notion of an unambiguous formula
in prefix-matrix form. The number of possible interpretations of an ambiguous
formula in PMF will depend on two factors: (1) the number of names used in the
matrix and (2) the prefix. Mathematically, the most succinct way of expressing
possibilities of disambiguation based on a set of names is by co-reference sets,
which are partitions of the set of names into sets of co-referring names. For
two names a and b there are only two possible partitions: {{a, b}}, in which
a and b co-refer and {{a}, {b}}, in which a and b have distinct reference. For
three names there are five, for four names fifteen. In general, the number of
possible disambiguations of a formula with n names will be equal to the n-
th Bell number. Let us call a conjunction of identity statements inducing a
partition on a set of names a “canonical conjunction of identity statements” or
“canonical conjunction” (CC) for short. A canonical conjunction expressing the
co-reference set {{a, b}, {c, d}}, for example, will be a = b∧ c = d∧¬a = c.13 A
formula in prefix-matrix form will then be considered unambiguous if the prefix
is “canonical” relative to the matrix.
If a given prefix-matrix form is ambiguous, it has to be expanded into a
disjunction of unambiguous PMF. This can be achieved by considering the set
of all co-reference sets consistent with the given prefix. The original formula
will be equivalent to the disjunction of the conjunctions of the matrix with CCs
expressing the elements of this set. Let us call this disjunction of unambiguous
PMF, which is equivalent to the original PMF, the “disambiguating disjunc-
tion” (DD) for that PMF. Based on the DD of the formula, the set of possible
translations into exclusive notation can then be generated by substituting in ac-
cordance with the prefixes of the individual disjuncts of the DD, each disjunct
generating one possible translation.14 For illustration, here are the steps for
the missing case Fab: Based on the set {a, b} of names occurring in the matrix
Fab, there are two canonical conjunctions (CC): a = b and ¬a = b, expressing
the co-reference sets {{a, b}} and {{a}, {b}}, respectively. Since both CC are
consistent with the (empty) prefix of Fab, the disambiguating disjunction of
12I.e. we exclude cases like a = b where the prefix governs no matrix, cases like Fab ∧ a =
b∧¬a = b, Fab∧¬a = a or Fab∧ a = a, in which the prefix is either inconsistent or contains
identities classically considered to be logical truths or falsehoods, and cases like Fab ∧ c = d
where prefix and matrix bypass each other.
13For most co-reference sets there will be more than one equivalent canonical conjunction.
In the example, we could also use a = b∧ c = d∧¬b = d to express the same co-reference set.
14If the prefix contains positive identities, there will be more than one possible substitution
with the same meaning. For the sake of economy, we arbitrarily choose the substitution that
comes first in lexical order. See fn. 11.
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unambiguous PMF is Fab ∧ a = b ∨ Fab ∧ ¬a = b.15 Each disjunct of the DD
yields a possible translation by substituting in accordance with the respective
CC, yielding the set {Faa, Fab} of possible translations.
4.7 Logical Equivalence for Prefix-Matrix Forms
At this point we return to the question posed in section 4.2: Is there a sense in
which a set of possible exclusive translations can be considered logically equiv-
alent to an inclusive formula? There are two main difficulties for defining a
suitable concept. First, we have to explain what it means for a single formula
to be logically equivalent to a set of formulas. Second, there is the fact that,
while classically understood, identity statements contribute to the truth con-
ditions of a formula, exclusively understood they instead fix the meaning of
the identity-free part of the formula. In order to do justice to the exclusive
viewpoint, the definition of logical equivalence has to reflect this difference.
In the last section, we already defined the concept of a “disambiguating dis-
junction”, which is the disjunction of unambiguous PMF equivalent to some
ambiguous PMF of inclusive logic. Since each disjunct of the DD generates
one possible exclusive translation, we solve the first difficulty by defining an
inclusive PMF φ to be logically equivalent to a set of possible exclusive trans-
lations iff for every disjunct of the disambiguating disjunction of φ there is a
logically equivalent exclusive translation in the set of possible translations and
vice versa. Logical equivalence between individual unambiguous inclusive for-
mula (the “disambiguating disjuncts”) and individual exclusive translation can
be defined by restricting the available models to those we may term “appropri-
ate” to the prefix that goes into the translation. In the example of the missing
case, we will thus only use models with =(a) = =(b) for assessing the equivalence
between Fab ∧ a = b and Faa and only models with =(a) 6= =(b) for assessing
the equivalence between Fab∧¬a = b and Fab. In general, an unambiguous in-
clusive formula in PMF φ is logically equivalent to an exclusive formula ψ iff for
all models M that are appropriate for φ, M satisfies φ iff it satisfies ψ. A model
M is considered appropriate for φ iff its interpretation of names is consistent
with the prefix of φ.16 An interpretation of names is consistent with a prefix iff
it would classically be considered to make the prefix true. On this conception,
{Faa, Fab} indeed proves to be a logically equivalent exclusive translation of
Fab (inclusive).
15Since we have coined the term “prefix” for the identities a = b and ¬a = b in this formula,
it might be more perspicuous to use a notation reflecting the analogy to quantifiers by for
example writing (a = b)Fab∨ (¬a = b)Fab, but since this makes no logical difference we stick
with Wittgenstein’s “postfix” notation of remark 5.531.
16This notion of an “appropriate” model marks the main difference to Wehmeier’s approach.
Wehmeier defines logical equivalence based only on models and assignments that are 1-1 on
names and free variables. In a sense, this imposition of an exclusive semantics on the inclusive
notation has masked the problematic nature of case #1 for Wehmeier.
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§5 The Problem of Pseudo-Propositions
5.1 Wehmeier’s Approach to Pseudo-Propositions
Next to the problem concerning names there is a second problem with Weh-
meier’s account of Wittgenstein’s elimination of identity having to do with
so-called “pseudo-propositions” (Scheinsa¨tze) of classical logic. Following the
outline of his proposal in remarks 5.53 to 5.533, Wittgensteins claims:
5.534 And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation pseudo-
propositions like ‘a = a’, ‘a = b.b = c. ⊃ .a = c’, ‘(x).x = x’,
‘(∃x).x = a’, etc. cannot even be written down.
From the standpoint of classical logic, all these formulas would be considered
logical truths. Since we are dealing only with quantifier-free logic at the moment,
we may restrict our attention to a = a and a = b∧b = c→ a = c (a.k.a. the law
of transitivity). Based on our interpretation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of
the identity sign so far, why would he consider these formulas to be “pseudo-
propositions”? For one, it seems clear that neither of the two is interpretable
as a substitution license or prohibition fixing the use of names in any way.
Second, these formulas lack matrices, consisting purely of identity statements.
Most interpreters have taken 5.534 to exclude formulas like a = a from the
“correct conceptual notation”.17 Wehmeier, as we have seen, takes a different
approach. He takes statements of the form x = x to be translatable into a
tautology involving x, and statements of the form x = y to be translatable into
a contradiction involving x and y.
The essential virtue of this approach, which was probably decisive for Weh-
meier’s endorsement of it, is the fact that only by translating a = a as a tautol-
ogy is there any hope of getting equivalent exclusive translations for equivalent
inclusive statements. In classical logic, a = a is equivalent to Fa∨¬Fa. So any
translation procedure that would translate a truth-functional tautology into a
truth-functional tautology, but would deny a = a representation in the exclusive
notation, would violate what we could call the “equivalence principle”, namely,
that formulas which are classically equivalent should also have equivalent exclu-
sive translations. In order to make this principle precise, let us call two exclusive
formulas φ and ψ logically equivalent iff for all structures U that are 1-1 on the
set of names U satisfies φ iff U satisfies ψ.18 We can then define two classical
formulas φ and ψ to have equivalent exclusive translations iff either (1) both are
17See for example Fogelin (1987, p. 74), McGray (2006, p. 159) and Kremer (2007, p. 155).
18At first, this definition may seem at odds with our earlier contention that in a certain sense
Faa and Fbb are equivalent translations of the inclusive formula Fab∧a = b because it makes
Faa and Fbb non-equivalent. But what we meant is that it doesn’t matter which way we
substitute as long as the substitution is carried out uniformly. In the case of a single formula
this means uniformly throughout the whole formula, but in the case of multiple formulas to be
translated into exclusive notation, the substitution has to be carried out uniformly throughout
the whole set of formulas. So the criterion of logical equivalence should only be applied to
formulas translated according to the same substitution. Relative to a fixed substitution, Faa
and Fbb should indeed count as non-equivalent.
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classified as pseudo-propositions from the exclusive standpoint, or (2) neither φ
nor ψ are classified as pseudo-propositions and their translations are equivalent.
The evidence that Wittgenstein didn’t intend the pseudo-propositions of
5.534 to be represented by tautologies or contradictions is very strong, how-
ever. In 5.531, the phrase Wittgenstein uses to give his translations is “Ich
schreibe also nicht [. . .], sondern [. . .]”19. So it seems obvious that there is an
intended contrast, when in 5.534 he says, “dass Scheinsa¨tze wie [. . .] sich in
einer richtigen Begriffsschrift gar nicht hinschreiben lassen” (our emphasis)20.
Wehmeier thinks we should interpret this phrase literally : Since the new nota-
tion doesn’t contain the identity sign, a = a literally cannot be written down
(Rogers & Wehmeier 2012, p. 13). But given the context of the remark this
seems artificial. If Wittgenstein had wanted to use a tautology as the exclusive
transcription of a = a, it would have been natural for him to write “Ich schreibe
also nicht a = a, sondern Fa ∨ Fa” (or any other tautologous formula). Also
the expression “gar nicht” (“not at all”) seems to indicate that there is noth-
ing to be written down. Finally, if Wittgenstein only meant to say that these
pseudo-propositions cannot literally be written down, this would also exclude
the sentences in 5.531 to 5.5321 from being written down since they also in-
clude the identity sign. But for these sentences Wittgenstein explicitly offers
instructions on how to write them down. We also take issue with Wehmeier’s
suggestion that pseudo-propositions like a = a are conceptually in the same
category as truth-functional tautologies.21 It is widely agreed that there is a
distinction to be made between non-sensical pseudo-propositions and merely
senseless tautologies.22 Tautologies are never marked as “Scheinsa¨tze” in the
Tractatus.23
An even stronger piece of evidence comes from an interesting letter by
Wittgenstein addressed to Ramsey in 1927. In his “Foundations of Mathemat-
ics” Ramsey had acknowledged Wittgenstein’s criticism of identity, but instead
of abandoning it, he defined a substitute for the identity relation, which shares
an important feature with Wehmeier’s account: According to Ramsey’s defini-
tion, any formula of the form x = x will be tautologous and any formula of
the form x = y will be contradictory. Now, in the letter criticizing Ramsey’s
definition, Wittgenstein writes, after summarizing Ramsey’s account:
I will try to show that this definition won’t do nor any other that
tries to make x = y a tautology or a contradiction. (Ramsey 1991,
p. 339, our emphasis)
19“Thus I do not write [. . .] but [. . .]”.
20“that in a correct conceptual notation pseudo-propositions like [. . .] cannot even be written
down”.
21Cf. Rogers & Wehmeier (2012, p. 12)
22See Glock (1996, p. 232), for example. In the typescript TS 202, fol.64v, there is the
following note in Russell’s hand: “6.2 Scheinsa¨tze = pseudo-props [as opposed to tautologies
& to significant props]”(Graßhoff & Lampert 2004, p. 245).
23The term “Scheinsatz” appears three times in the Tractatus: in remarks 4.1272, 5.534
and 6.2.
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From an exegetical point of view this seems to pretty much settle the issue.24
We may still reflect about why Wittgenstein didn’t want to “make x = y a tau-
tology or a contradiction”. One systematic reason seems to be Wittgenstein’s
analysis of logical truth as truth-functional tautology. Logical truth is not a
matter of the content of any statement but only of the form of truth-functional
combination of atomic propositions. But this wouldn’t be true of identity state-
ments because statements like a = a or ∀xx = x would emerge as logical truths
which are not truth-functional tautologies. Also, since a = a seems to be an
atomic proposition and yet a logical truth, it would no longer be possible to
think of the world as an assignment of truth-values to atomic propositions.25
According to Wittgenstein, all atomic propositions represented in the formalism
should be bipolar, i.e. capable of being true or false, which certainly isn’t the
case for a = a.
5.2 Excluding Pseudo-Propositions
As a next step, we should wonder how comprehensive is this class of nonsensical
pseudo-propositions? Concerning instances of the “law of identity”, i.e. formu-
las like a = a or b = b, the reasoning seems clear. Applying the understanding of
identity statements we ascribe to Wittgenstein, we argue that, since any name
is always substitutable for itself, a = a represents an empty substitution rule.
Analogously, we argue that ¬a = a, which is not explicitly treated in 5.534 (or
anywhere else in the Tractatus), must be considered a nonsensical substitution
rule prohibiting the substitution of a name for itself. This difference between
empty and nonsensical rules becomes important when we consider a = a and
¬a = a as possible prefixes. In Fab ∧ a = a the prefix is redundant; since noth-
ing is prescribed it can be eliminated without loss. So in our view Fab ∧ a = a
is equivalent to Fab and can be disambiguated as Faa or Fab (exclusive). In
Fab∧¬a = a, however, the prefix is nonsensical, prescribing something impossi-
ble. On our interpretation, this vitiates any translation into exclusive notation.
What about a = b? This is neither a redundant nor a nonsensical substitution
rule, but occurring in isolation, it is unclear what the rule is supposed to be ap-
plied to. Exploiting the prefix-matrix analogy, a = b by itself may be considered
similar to a quantifier occurring by itself. But ∀x or ∃x by itself would usually
not be considered a well-formed formula. Our conclusion is that a = b by itself
should similarly be considered ill-formed and therefore denied translation.26 In
summary:
• Any prefix not governing any matrix must be considered nonsensical be-
cause there is no proposition the substitution rules are applied to.
24Unfortunately, we cannot go into the question of how Wittgenstein professes to show
that Ramsey’s definition “won’t do”. The argument in the letter is difficult to the point of
inscrutability. A credible attempt at interpretation is made in Sullivan (1995).
25See, for example, White (1979), Landini (2007, p. 253) and Wehmeier (2008).
26In the Notebooks, a = b is explicitly qualified as “Scheinsatz” (Wittgenstein 1998, p. 19)
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• Identity-logical “tautologies” such as a = a or the law of transitivity occur-
ring in a prefix governing a matrix must be considered redundant because
they don’t fix the use of names in any way.
• Identity-logical “contradictions” such as ¬a = a occurring in a prefix
governing a matrix must be considered nonsensical because there is no
coherent way to prescribe different meanings for one and the same name.
In section 5.1 we introduced the “equivalence principle” stating that formu-
las which are classically equivalent should also have equivalent exclusive trans-
lations. It is clear that this principle is violated if we deny formulas like a = a,
a = b or ¬a = a representation in the exclusive notation. For example, Fa∨¬Fa
is classically equivalent to a = a. However, since the first formula is in prefix-
matrix form (with an empty prefix) it can be translated into Fa ∨ ¬Fa while
a = a by itself has no exclusive translation. Thus, classically equivalent for-
mulas receive translations into exclusive notation which are non-equivalent in
the sense that one is translated as a tautology while the other is denied rep-
resentation. As we see it, this strange feature of the exclusive notation is a
consequence of Wittgenstein’s critique of the classical understanding of iden-
tity. Conceptualizing identity as a relation between objects can be seen as the
kind of “misunderstanding of language” to be cleared up by philosophical anal-
ysis. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, classical quantifier-free logic falls short
of constituting a proper logic. This defect shows up in the way the proper
understanding of identity (as a rule governing the use of signs) invalidates cer-
tain classical formulas and principles of inference. However, in the cases we
have dealt with so far, this violation of the equivalence principle is merely a
“local” violation in the sense that it only affects the distinction between non-
sensical pseudo-propositions on the one hand and merely senseless tautologies
and contradictions on the other hand. In other words, there aren’t any cases in
which the equivalence principle is violated unless the translation of equivalent
formulas yields a tautology or contradiction in one case and is rejected as a
pseudo-proposition in the other case.
§6 Towards A Generalized Translation Proce-
dure
6.1 Disjunctive Prefix-Matrix Forms
We are now in possession of (1) a positive criterion defining a class of formulas
whose translation into exclusive notation seems clear (“prefix-matrix form”) and
(2) a negative criterion defining a class of formulas which must be considered
untranslatable (“pseudo-propositions”). In between these classes, there is still
a large gray area of formulas whose translatability is doubtful. In this and
the next section we attempt to generalize both of our criteria into an account
covering this area.
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In section 4.6, we only considered formulas consisting of a single matrix
and a single prefix. We now consider disjunctive prefix-matrix forms (DPMF),
which we define as disjunctions (which may be of length one) of subformulas
in prefix-matrix form as defined in section 4.6. Since a DPMF will typically
have multiple matrices and multiple prefixes, we have to adjust condition (3)
for prefixes (cf. section 4.6): names in prefixes should occur in some matrix of
the DPMF (not necessarily the matrix governed by the prefix). To generate the
“disambiguating disjunction” (DD) for a DPMF we proceed as follows:
1. Generate the set of canonical conjunctions expressing all possible parti-
tions of the set of names occurring in any matrix.
2. For each CC in the set that is consistent with at least one prefix in the
DPMF, we generate one disjunct of the DD by:
(a) Forming the disjunction of all matrices of the DPMF whose prefix is
consistent with the CC.
(b) Conjoining the CC as prefix to this disjunction.
Let us illustrate this procedure with an example. For the formula (Fab ∨
Gab) ∧ a = b ∨ Fac ∧ a = b ∧ ¬a = c, which is in disjunctive prefix-matrix
form, there are two CCs expressing different partitions of the set of names
compatible with at least one of the prefixes: {a = b∧a = c, a = b∧¬a = c}. To
generate the disambiguating conjunction, we take each CC in turn and conjoin
it to the disjunction of all matrices whose prefixes are consistent with the CC.
This yields the DD (Fab ∨ Gab) ∧ a = b ∧ a = c ∨ (Fab ∨ Gab ∨ Fac) ∧ a =
b ∧ ¬a = c. Each disjunct of the DD is an unambiguous PMF and can be used
to generate one possible exclusive translation by substitution, yielding the set of
possible translations {Faa ∨Gaa, Faa ∨Gaa ∨ Fac}. Since a DPMF generates
a disambiguating disjunction just like the more restrictive PMF, the definition
of logical equivalence given in 4.7 applies equally to DPMF.
6.2 Disjunctive Normal Forms
Disjunctive prefix-matrix forms are still a fairly narrow class of formulas. For
further generalization we take a second look at the stipulations for prefix-matrix
form in section 4.6. There we required (1) that the matrix not be empty, (2)
that the prefix be consistent and non-redundant and (3) that all names occur-
ring in prefixes also occur in the matrix. Stipulations (1) and (2) were partly
borne out by our analysis in secton 5.2, since identity statements occurring in
isolation, as well as inconsistent prefixes, were ruled out as nonsensical. Con-
cerning prefixes like a = a, we argued that they were not strictly nonsensical
but merely redundant. “Allowing” the substitution of a name for itself seems to
be compatible with any “mode of signifying” whatsoever, so that Fab ∧ a = a
should have the same translation as Fab. We now also argue that an inconsis-
tent prefix governing a single disjunct, as for example in Fab ∨ Gab ∧ ¬a = a,
doesn’t affect other disjuncts and should be treated as a disjunct incompatible
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with any CC, leading to the elimination of the disjunct. Finally, concerning
(1), we argue that a formula containing a disjunct with empty matrix such as
Fab∨ a = b is not nonsensical per se, but only relative to a given CC consistent
with the matrix-less prefix. Disambiguating the formula according to the CC
¬a = b we simply eliminate the second disjunct on the ground of its prefix being
inconsistent with the CC. On this view, Fab ∨ a = b would receive the same
translation as the formula Fab ∧ ¬a = b.
Concerning condition (3), we see that formulas like Fab ∧ c = d have both
a matrix and a consistent prefix, but matrix and prefix bypass each other. We
argue that Fab∧ c = d is analogous to ∃xφ where x has no free occurrence in φ.
Depending on the way the syntax is set up, such cases may either be rejected as
ill-formed or else the semantics should make clear that the quantifier contributes
nothing to the truth-conditions of the formula and could be eliminated without
loss. In fact, we can convince ourselves that something like the latter is the
case for Fab ∧ c = d by the following consideration: In what way could the
identity c = d become relevant for the translation of the matrix Fab? For each
of the names c and d there are two possibilities: Either it co-refers with one
or both names in the matrix – then it could be substituted for that name, but
we could also express the same meaning by leaving the original name in place;
or its reference is different from both names in the matrix – then the name
doesn’t occur in any matrix and is irrelevant for translating the formula. The
same reasoning can be applied to convince ourselves that c = d is irrelevant for
translating the first disjunct in Fab ∨ c = d, but here the additional question
arises whether this formula should count as a pseudo-proposition. Relative to a
hypothetical CC in which c and d co-refer, it should indeed. But for any such
CC there is another CC differing from the first one only with respect to c and
d having different reference. Disambiguation according to this second CC will
eliminate the deviant disjunct, leaving only the first disjunct Fab for translation.
We therefore propose to eliminate all prefixes containing names not occurring
in any matrix. In the case of Fab ∨ c = d this leads to the elimination of the
second disjunct. Thus, according to this argument, Fab∧ c = d and Fab∨ c = d
are equivalent to Fab with respect to their translation into exclusive notation.
As it turns out, there is little to distinguish DPMFs in which conditions (1)
to (3) are relaxed in the way just described from ordinary disjunctive normal
forms of quantifier-free logic. One major conceptual difference between DPMFs
and disjunctive normal forms (DNFs) is that the former are guaranteed to have
at least one possible translation into exclusive notation, while DNFs may also be
pseudo-propositions not translatable at all. Here is the algorithm for generating
the DD for a DNF:
1. Eliminate all prefixes or elements of prefixes containing names not occur-
ring in any matrix.
2. If any disjuncts remain, generate the set of canonical conjunctions express-
ing all possible partitions of the set of names occurring in any matrix.
3. For each CC in the set that is consistent with the prefix of at least one
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disjunct in the DNF:
(a) if any of these disjuncts with a prefix consistent with the CC has no
matrix, there is no possible translation according to this CC;
(b) if all prefixes consistent with the CC have matrices we generate one
disjunct of the DD by:
i. Forming the disjunction of all matrices of the DNF whose prefix
is consistent with the CC.
ii. Conjoining the CC as prefix to this disjunction.
If no DD is generated, the formula is a nonsensical pseudo-proposition. A
disjunct consisting only of a redundant prefix by itself, for example, will be con-
sistent with any CC and therefore any formula containing it will not yield any
translations. A disjunct containing a contradictory prefix will be inconsistent
with any CC and not yield any translation for that disjunct. If a disjunct con-
sists only of identities containing names not occurring in any matrix, elimination
of the prefix will eliminate the whole disjunct.
Concerning the definition of logical equivalence, we may wonder whether it is
extendable to pseudo-propositions. A simple consideration shows that it is. We
have to distinguish two cases: If the algorithm generates a DD, the definition
clearly applies. If the algorithm generates no DD, thus revealing the formula to
be a pseudo-proposition, the definition also applies because for every disjunct of
the DD (namely, none) there is an equivalent translation (and vice versa). The
algorithm for disjunctive normal forms therefore performs a double function:
it disambiguates a formula insofar it is meaningful (i.e. not nonsensical), but
it may also reveal a formula itself or aspects of it (as in Fab ∨ a = b) to be
nonsensical.
Given a translation procedure for disjunctive normal forms, extending the
account to arbitrary formulas of quantifier-free logic may seem easy. After all,
any formula of quantifier-free logic has an equivalent disjunctive normal form.
However, as we have seen in section §5, equivalence transformations considered
valid in classical logic are put in doubt by Wittgenstein’s account of the role
of identity statements. Tautology introduction, for example, is an equivalence
transformation of classical logic that allows us to go from a = b to (Fab ∨
¬Fab) ∧ a = b. But the first formula is considered nonsensical by our account
while the second is translated as a tautology. Therefore, tautology introduction
is not an equivalence transformation from the standpoint of exclusive logic.
Before extending our account to arbitrary formulas of quantifier-free logic we
would have to make sure that none of the equivalence transformations needed
to transform an arbitrary formula into disjunctive normal form changes the
exclusive translation of the formula.These are: definition of operators in terms
of disjunction, conjunction and negation, De Morgan’s laws and distributive
laws. If we assume these to be unproblematic, full generality of the algorithm
could be achieved by transforming any formula into disjunctive normal form
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and then applying the algorithm.27
This concludes our treatment of Wittgenstein’s elimination of identity for
quantifier-free logic. The next step in the development of exclusive logic would
be to extend our treatment to quantified logic, but since this leads to a host of
further difficult problems, we reserve this step for a different occasion.
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